Illinois Wesleyan University

Digital Commons @ IWU
Honors Projects

Philosophy

4-18-2005

Hume's Objection to the Thomistic Doctrine on Suicide
Emily M. Kelahan '05
Illinois Wesleyan University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/phil_honproj
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Kelahan '05, Emily M., "Hume's Objection to the Thomistic Doctrine on Suicide" (2005).
Honors Projects. 5.
https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/phil_honproj/5

This Article is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital
Commons @ IWU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this material in any
way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For
other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights
are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/ or on the work itself. This material
has been accepted for inclusion by faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.

•
Emily M. Kelahan

Burne's Objection to the Thomistic Doctrine
on Suicide
Emily M. Kelahan
Illinois Wesleyan University
Spring 2005
Research Honors Project
Hearing Date April 18, 2005

I. Introduction
In "Of Suicide," David Hume argues against the dominant Thomistic doctrine on suicide.
Thomas Aquinas, in Summa Theologica, I-IL Q64, Art 5, argues that suicide is morally
impermissible because it violates three kinds of duties: one's duty to God, to others, and to
oneself. Arguing from within the Thomistic framework, Hume exposes the inconsistencies of
Aquinas's theory and refutes Aquinas's arguments against suicide. In this paper I look at only
the arguments concerning the ways in which suicide violates a duty to God.
My strategy is as follows. First, I argue that G.R. McLean's interpretation of Hume in his
paper "Hume and the Theistic Objection to Suicide" is not only philosophically unsound, but
also departs significantly from the text of "Of Suicide." I then offer my own interpretation of
Hume's arguments in "Of Suicide," which both avoids the problems that McLean's
interpretation faces and is closer to the text. Finally, I raise and respond to one possible
objection to my interpretation ofHume's argument. Ultimately, I intend to argue that Hume's
attack on the Thomistic doctrine on suicide is actually an attack on the broader Thomistic
framework, and that to read "Of Suicide" in isolation from Hume's other works leads to error.
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II. The Problem with Hume, According to McLean
What McLean calls the "theistic objection" is essentially this: God created us and only he
has the right to dispose of our lives; we do not have this right. McLean takes Hume to be trying
l

"to show that even on theistic grounds" suicide is not actually prohibited. He argues that
Hume's attack, on his reading of Hume's argument, is unsuccessful. McLean thinks the bulk of
Hume's argument lies in the following passage:
Were the disposal of human life so much reserved as the particular province of the
Almighty that it were an encroachment on his right for men to dispose of their own lives;
it would be equally criminal to act for the preservation of life as for its destruction. If I
turn aside a stone which is falling upon my head, I disturb the course of nature, and I
invade the particular province of the Almighty by lengthening out my life beyond the
period by which the general laws of matter and motion he had assigned it?

He says this is Hume's objection "put in a nutshell." I disagree. First, McLean ignores a
significant portion of Hume's argument against the Thomistic doctrine on suicide. Hume offers
at least one argument in response to each of the three ways in which Aquinas finds suicide to be
impermissible. Secondly, McLean misinterprets the portion of Hume's argument to which he
responds, the portion that takes suicide to be a violation of our duty to God. He thinks Hume
offers a reductio ad absurdum of the following form: 3

I McLean, G.R., "Hume and the Theistic Objection to Suicide," American Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 38,
Number 1, January 2001, pp. 99.
2 Hume, David, "Of Suicide," Essays MoraL Political. and Literary, ed. Eugene E. Miller, Liberty Fund,
Indianapolis: 1985. pp. 583.
3 McLean calls this argument a reductio. It actually has the form of modus tolIens, which is what McLean
sometimes maintains. For clarity's sake, I will consistently refer to his interpretation as a reductio. Though McLean
is careless in calling the grounds for his inference a reductio in some places and a modus tolIens in others, his
carelessness is not problematic. McLean wants to deny the fIrst premise, and he can do this whether he calls the
move a reductio or a modus tolIens.

2

Emily M. Ke1ahan

1. If disposing of my life invades the province of God, then preserving my life similarly
invades the province of God.
2. Preserving my life does not invade the province of God.
3. Disposing of my life does not invade the province of God. 4
More basically:
1. A-7B

2. .....,B
3. .....,A

McLean sees a problem with the argument because most theists would accept the second
premise but reject the first premise. To show this, McLean offers his interpretation in its contra
positive form:
1. If preserving my life does not invade the province of God, then disposing of my life
does not invade the province of God.
2. Preserving my life does not invade the province of God.
3. Disposing of my life does not invade the province of God
More basically:

1. .....,A-7.....,B
2. .....,A

3. .....,B
In an effort to refute premise one, McLean draws an analogy between placing money in a bank
and God's placing life in our care. You deposit money in a bank trusting that the bank will
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preserve it. By preserving your deposit, the bank does not invade your province as the owner of
that money. However, if the bank manager decides to take your money, and dispose of it by
buying a new car, the bank invades your province as the owner of that money. 5 Similarly,
theists, as McLean describes them, hold that life is a trust placed in our hands for safekeeping,
and is therefore not for disposal at our will.
III. The First Problem with McLean
McLean thinks Hume offers a failed reductio ad absurdum of Aquinas's argument. I
agree that Hume offers a reductio, but I argue that it is a different kind of reductio, and that
Hume's argument is actually successful. Before I offer my own interpretation of Hume's
argument, I want to show that McLean's interpretation of Rume's argument is both
philosophically unsound and textually inaccurate.
Ifwe accept McLean's interpretation ofRume and his argument against Hume, we have
two options both of which are problematic. First, we might accept McLean's interpretation of
Hume's argument and reject his bank analogy. The contrapositive form of Hume's argument, as
interpreted by McLean, is refuted by the bank analogy only if a contractual agreement holds both
for the bank and for our duty to preserve life. In the case of the bank we have certain reasonable
expectations. Banks are human institutions, and we are in a good position to know exactly what
banks are supposed to do. It is understood, and in fact supported by contract and law, that the
money in a bank's possession is to be disposed of by the clients only, except under a few
extreme circumstances. However, a theist might reject this analogy on the grounds that there is
no such explicit agreement between God and us. Stewards oflife have no explicit job

McLean, G.R., "Hume and the Theistic Objection to Suicide," American Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 38,
Number 1, January 2001, pp. 100.
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Actually, an employee of the bank is invading your province as the owner ofthat money, so this
analogy is a bit shaky.
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description, while bankers should have a good understanding of what their job entails. If you
take this first option, you may argue for the second premise on different grounds while rejecting
the first premise. This position may have some potential for success, but I will not explore it
here.
A second option is to accept both the argument and the analogy, which raises two serious
problems. The first concerns the notion of stewardship, which is frustratingly vague, since as it
is used here, the scope and limits of what constitutes proper stewardship are never specified. In
ordinary life, most people act in ways that preserve their lives and they are not called upon to
provide philosophical justification for doing so. When a theist claims that there is such a thing as
a duty to serve as steward of life, on par with the duty of banks to preserve their clients' money,
she must provide determinate criteria for what counts as stewardship. But there are no
philosophical grounds for believing that God has named humans stewards of life, and even if a

theist somehow proved a less extreme claim about a duty to preserve life, she would still have to
provide determinate criteria for what counts as fulfilling this duty. From what I can see, McLean
has not given us any good idea of what these criteria might be. This is a problem for McLean
and other theists because with no determinate criteria in place for what counts as stewardship,
they are in danger of sliding down a slippery slope to another serious problem. Namely, the
theist will be forced to accept conclusions that her doctrine prohibits. I call this problem "the
problem of duties without limits."

IV. The Problem of Duties without Limits
McLean argues on behalf of theists that there is a duty to preserve life and that this duty
does not invade the province of God. He does not place limits on the duty to preserve life, and
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this is dangerous for the theist. Ifwe are required to preserve life without limits, then any sort of
preservation is permissible, and this seems intuitively false.
I think all theists would agree that some life-preserving measures are morally
impermissible. If there is some duty to preserve life, certainly it must be limited by such
principles as "do not harm one person's life in an effort to preserve another person's life." The
type of unacceptable conclusion to which I was referring in the previous paragraph is one in
which it becomes acceptable for a person to interfere with the natural death of either herself or
another person. A common example is keeping a loved one who has little or no chance for
recovery from a serious illness on life support for an exorbitant amount of time. Consider again
McLean's bank analogy. Perhaps in the case of the extremely ill loved one, God is attempting to
take his money out of the bank. Our refusal to take this person off life support may be construed
as an interference with God's will, especially since it appears to interfere with the "course of
nature." This case illustrates the need to place parameters on our duties as stewards of our lives.
If there are no such parameters, we become like banks that do not allow their clients to withdraw
their deposits.
Another more extreme case in which an undesirable conclusion results from accepting
an unqualified duty to preserve life might be the development of an immortality elixir. Suppose
we could create an elixir that would make us immortal, thus preserving our lives forever. If the
bank analogy holds, we might very well be the most excellent bankers the world has seen. Just
as we facilitate immortality, the bank would keep our money safe forever. McLean and other
theists might make a distinction here between preserving life and prolonging it, but this
distinction would be unsuccessful from where they now stand. With no criteria in place for
determining what rightly counts as stewardship and preservation, they have no way of
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detennining what does not count. The subtle distinction between preservation and prolonging of
life requires some thoughtful, rigorous philosophical analysis. Simply claiming that God
approves of one act and not the other will not do.

V. The Real Problem
McLean's most significant difficulty derives not from the aforementioned concerns, but
rather from a misinterpretation of Hume's argument. Hume's argument against Aquinas cannot
be contained in McLean's "nutshell" and it does not follow "a straightforward modus tollens
fonn," as McLean thinks it does. 6 Here is the argument in Hume's own words:
Were the disposal of human life so much reserved as the peculiar province of the
almighty that it were an encroachment on his right for men to dispose of their own lives;
it would be equally criminal to act for the preservation of life as for its destruction. 7

Hume's argument, as I think it should be read, is as follows:
1. One can act to dispose of one's life.
2. One can act to preserve one's life.
3. Both 1 and 2 invade the province of God.
4. Invading the province of God is impennissible.
Therefore, 5. 1 and 2 are impennissible.
This argument is both a consistency argument and a reductio ad absurdum. It is a consistency
argument because Hume responds to the arbitrary way in which Aquinas's view allows some
human actions to fall under the blanket of moral pennissibility, while excluding others. Hume is
trying to point out that we really have no philosophical reason for believing that some actions

McLean, G.R., "Hume and the Theistic Objection to Suicide," American Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 38,
Number 1, January 2001, pp. 101.
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Hume, David, "Of Suicide," Essays Moral, Political. and Literary, ed. Eugene E. Miller, Liberty Fund,
Indianapolis: 1985. pp.583.
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invade God's province, and thus are immoral, while others do not. Basically, Hume is telling
Aquinas that he can't have it both ways. If God's immutable laws govern the material world, as
Hume understands them to be on his interpretation of Aquinas, then every act that invades God's
province is either equally morally impermissible or equally morally permissible. This argument
is a reductio because if you accept the premises, you are led to what, on Aquinas's view of the
universe, is a necessarily false conclusion. It could never be the case, on Aquinas's view, that
preserving life is morally impermissible.
Hume assumes, for the sake of argument, Aquinas's conception of the universe. Under
this conception, immutable physical laws govern the material world. Within the material world,
God endows all living creatures with physical and mental powers. These powers allow these
creatures to pursue the sorts of lives for which they are destined. The laws that govern the
material world and the powers that govern living creatures constantly encroach upon each other
and affect each other's operation. The mental powers of animals, like those of humans, encroach
upon the material world in such cases as the use of natural resources like trees to build shelters.
Likewise, nature restrains human activity in such cases as when a river blocks human motion
across the earth. 8 This acting upon each other does not result in disorder, but rather in harmony.
God governs through these laws. Therefore, in a strong sense, all events are actions of God, as
they all proceed from his laws. No action is exempt from these immutable laws. 9
According to this conception of the universe, it is difficult to see what grounds a theist
who wants to defend the whole of Aquinas's system has for her position. Hume contends that it
cannot be the case that God has reserved for himself the disposal of human life because human
life is subject to the same laws as the lives of all animals, and suicide is not a violation of these
\8Hume, David, "Of Suicide," Essays Moral. Political. and Literary, ed. Eugene E. Miller, Liberty Fund,

'\Indiaru>poU" 1985. pp.580.
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laws. 10 Suicide cannot be found to be immoral on the grounds that it is wrong to disturb these
laws in any case. Hume thinks any assertion to the contrary is absurd. Animals are endowed
with their abilities and their prudence and are entrusted to use them to guide their conduct. ll
They can alter nature's operation as far as these powers will allow. If this were not the case,
living creatures could not survive. They would be killed by predators, natural disasters, or
illness. 12 Suicide does not encroach upon the laws of nature, but rather uses them. Hume
contends that if suicide were really a violation of God's province, he would have made laws
preventing it.
Hume's argument is a consistency argument at its core. Ifwe are allowed to pursue
means to prolong our lives, such as dodging a falling boulder or taking medicine, why can we
not pursue means to end our lives? Prolonging our lives, Hume thinks, must equally invade
God's province. However, neither prolonging nor ending your life to the extent that it is in your
power usurps the power of God because both actions follow the general laws God has created.
Hume thinks it is absurd to maintain that diverting the flow of a river accords with the laws of
nature, but diverting the flow of your own blood does not. 13 Unless the theist supplies some
philosophically satisfying criteria for when interference is morally permissible and when it is not,
God's province is compatible with both actions.

VI. The Real Reductio
This is where the real reductio lies. Hume's final conclusion within the Thomistic
framework is the following conditional: if suicide were truly an invasion of the province of God,
then the immutable laws through which God governs the universe would prevent it. This
Ibid., pp. 581
Ibid., pp. 582.
II Entrusted in a weaker sense than McLean means to use in his bank analogy; our mere possession of these abilities
implies that we are entrusted with them.

9

10

9

•
Emily M. Kelahan

conditional decomposes into what is for many people, theists and non-theists, a simpler, but
more unacceptable conditional. Aquinas contends that suicide is morally impermissible. Hume
thinks God's laws would prevent it ifit were truly morally impermissible. His argument
generalizes to this form: if any action were truly morally impermissible, then God's laws would
prevent it. If Hume is correct, it seems as though murder, rape, and pollution are morally
permissible. These things happen. No causal law prevents them from occurring. Does this
mean that Hume thinks God's laws would prevent all wrong actions ifthey were truly wrong?
Either Hume is wrong, Aquinas's God is not one many people would consider worthy of
worship, or there is more to Hume's position than initially meets the eye, or at least, McLean's
eye.
McLean responds to precisely this difficulty, that the laws of nature permit what
intuitively seem to be immoral acts, but he does so too hastily. He thinks Hume is unable to
draw the conclusion that every manipulation or disturbance of the laws of nature is either equally
impermissible or equally permissible from his premises, but this is because McLean has failed to
accurately characterize Hume's argument. McLean repeatedly chastises Hume for failing to
make a distinction between murder and suicide. As a result of Hume's failure to make this
distinction, McLean thinks Hume has no justification for his conclusion: "And because those
premises, so far stated, make no distinction between murder and suicide, we must conclude that
they provide no justification for the conclusion that suicide is legitimate.,,14 McLean has walked
directly into Hume's trap (though I do not mean to imply that Hume is doing something sneaky

Ibid., pp. 582.
Ibid., pp.583
14 McLean, G.R., "Hume and the Theistic Objection to Suicide," American Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 38,
Number 1, January 2001, PP' 99.
12
13
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here). Hume agrees that this conclusion is unacceptable, and that is why he finds Aquinas's
argument absurd!

VII. A Possible Objection
I would like to spend what remains of this paper considering a possible objection to my
interpretation of Hume's argument against the Thomistic doctrine on suicide. The objection is
that Hume's argument seems to completely disregard the concept of free will, which is essential
to Aquinas's (or any Christian thinker's) conception ofthe universe. In order to discuss this
objection, and to uncover the depth of Hume' s refutation of Aquinas, I must revisit the
framework within which both Aquinas and Hume are arguing. Hume takes Aquinas to believe in
a Deist conception of the world. IS This conception maintains that God constructed a system of
causal laws to govern the world, and then he figuratively sat back and let the laws do the work.
Aquinas believes suicide is an encroachment upon God's province, and therefore a sin. Hume
thinks if this were truly the case, the causal laws God created to govern the universe would
prevent it. This is the point in Hume's assessment where the problem of free will comes in. It is
essential to the Thomistic picture that humans have free will. Most people, not just Christians,
think of sin as something a person commits when she knows what the right action is, but chooses
the wrong action. If causal laws prevent wrong action, humans can never choose the wrong
actions or the right actions. This conflicts with the Christian idea that praise and blame, reward
and punishment, heaven and hell depend on our freedom to choose what to do.
I believe that Burne does not explain Aquinas's conception ofthe world thoroughly
enough to make "Of Suicide" an accessible stand-alone essay. To really feel the weight of
Burne's objections, we must unpack all of his implicit and unspoken premises. The first that

15 This may be a misinterpretation on Hume's part. Most philosophers now think Aquinas was a concurrentist.
During Hume's time, religious philosophers were either deists or occasionalists. Of the two, Aquinas is a deist.
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strikes me is that Aquinas's Deistic picture is causal. When Hume explicates Aquinas's position
he makes clear that all actions are indirectly God's actions, but he is not as clear as he could be
about why that is. Under the Thomistic view, our actions are God's actions because the laws of
cause and effect are necessary. For every cause, there is a necessary effect. There is no event
that escapes these laws and God, through his omniscience, knows about every event. Aquinas
accepts this account generally, but not its application to the human will. The human will, he
thinks, is not just another object governed by the causal laws. We make free choices.
Though Hume never explicitly says this in "Of Suicide," I think his suggestion that if
suicide offended God, his laws would prevent it is not only an indictment of Aquinas's position
on suicide but of his entire conception of a world governed by causal laws from which the
human will is somehow exempt. The hidden point ofHume's arguments might be that
Aquinas's entire system is flawed. Free will does not actually pose a problem for Hume because
Hume does not endorse this causal view of the universe. He does not think the creator set in
motion a universe in which every event necessarily follows previous events. Therefore, Aquinas
must explain how humans have free will in a universe that is otherwise one of necessity.
Hume is, without always explicitly saying so, reducing Aquinas's position to absurdity.
Either causal laws govern the world or they do not. I think Hume is implicitly arguing that
causal laws, in the Thomistic sense, do not govern the universe and that when we stop thinking
about the universe in terms of these laws we do not have the problem of whether acts are freely
willed by humans or predestined by God. The free will objection is refuted if we accept Hume's
implicit premise. The reason the conditional "if suicide were truly wrong, God's laws would
prevent it" is so bothersome is precisely because his laws do not prevent it. Nor do his laws
prevent murder, rape, or pollution, but this is perfectly consistent with what Hume is saying
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between the lines: moral rights and wrongs are not detennined by whether they please or offend
God. Not only is Aquinas's position internally flawed, it is also externally flawed. In the midst
of this internal critique, we must conclude that Hume is suggesting we reject this Thomistic
conception and think about morality from a different perspective. This interpretation derives
significant support from Hume's other works, particularly his Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding, Section 8, OfLiberty and Necessity. 16 "Of Suicide" read in a vacuum leads to

the type ofunsuccessful arguments made by McLean and others and to an incomplete
understanding of what is really a very rewarding piece ofphilosophy.17

My personal copy is one edited by Tom L. Beauchamp.
The others to whom I refer include Beauchamp. I fmd Beauchamp's contribution to David Hume Critical
Assessments, Volume VI, edited by Stanley Tweyman, London and New York: 1995, betrays a very shallow
reading and assessment of "Of Suicide." However, this is the subject of another, longer paper, which I am currently
writing.
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